# **Actuarial Society of India**

**Examinations** 

November 2005

**ST1 – Health Insurance** 

**Indicative Solutions** 

## **Q.1**)

RDR	It is the interest rate used to discount cashflows to calculate their present value Its level is a function of the risk free rate plus a margin to reflect the uncertainty in the future cashflows A fundamental parameter for profit testing and EV work	
Different RDR for health business	To reflect differences in the risk characteristics of health business cf. life Likely to use a higher RDR for health Greater pricing uncertainty and volatility in claims costs Future lapses and (claim management) expenses may be quite uncertain (esp. if relatively new lines of business) May just use higher RDR for particular cashflows (e.g. claims costs) Alternative is to use a higher profit criterion (e.g. PV profit as % of PV premiums	[2]

Q.2)

i)	Deferred period	Period of incapacity (according to injsurance definition) before income benefit commences Typically, ranges from 4 – 104 weeks.
ii)	Linked claims	Two claims for the same cause of disability, the second occurring within a prescribed period after termination of the first No deferred period on second claim if within the link period
iii)	Net replacement ratio	Ratio of post-disability income to pre-disability income, after tax, social security deductions
		Important that $< 1$ to maintain incentive to return to work
iv)	Proportionate benefit	Reduced IP benefit payable if claimant takes up alternative paid work while remaining disabled from original occupation
v)	ADWs	Alternative to occupational incapacity definition, requiring functional assessment of ability to perform particular tasks relevant to the workplace

[5]

#### Q.3)

Approach

channel, gender

#### Allocate exposure and withdrawals into the risk cells defined by the factors chosen Calculate withdrawal rates for each cell Consider the analysis be policies and amounts Limitations LTCI is relatively new product line => may have little prior experience of lapses on this product Unlikely to have experience of lapses at long policy durations propensity to claim ..... Particularly at older ages when a claim becomes more likely in those who already have disabling disease LTC triggers Activities of daily living (ADL) Typically, failure of 3 or 4 of 6 ADL May additionally require to be in formal care Benchmark ADL are Washing; Dressing; Feeding; Toileting; Mobility; Transferring Additional claim trigger of cognitive impairment is usual The latter usually overrides ADL failure to qualify for benefits Assessment of ADL failure generally involves determination of (i) persistent fa ..... (ii) inabi another person Testing for mental functio Claims trigger to function inc ..... with rega **Different triggers** The degree of for IP severe than th the tasks neces ..... so LTC Many genuine benefits using Most IP contracts employ an occupational definition (inability to perform the main tasks of usual occupation etc) ..... ..... so a claimant may be unable to work but still able to

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..... e.g. policy duration, calendar year, age, policy size, premium mode, distribution

Identify factors likely to have a bearing on lapse experience .....

Difficult to assess the extent to which withdrawals are selective with regard to

#### Q.4)

Cailure of the ADL;
ility for perform the ADL without the assistance of
n
cognitive failure involves standardised tests of
rs are designed to assess the ability of the insured
ard for personal safety and that of others
F incapacity at which LTC is required is much more nat at which it is not possible to perform physical ssary to hold down regular employment claim triggers are too tough for IP
ely disabled IP claimants would not qualify for
ADL triggers

function independently at home

[5]

[4]

IP claim triggers may be ADWs ...... ..... ADWs are similar to ADL but are geared to physical functions necessary for an individual to manage in the workplace

[5]

[5]

#### Q.5)

Why reinsure	<ul> <li>Desire to limit exposure to insurance risks</li> <li> likely small in-force portfolio</li> <li> and possibly limited capital to withstand volatility in claims</li> <li>To smooth the underwriting results</li> <li>Pricing uncertainty</li> <li>Limit exposure to peak risks</li> <li>And risk concentrations</li> <li>To assist with financing of new business strain</li> <li>To increase the insurer's capacity to accept risks (e.g. by reduction in solvency margin reqt.)</li> <li>To gain access to reinsurer's expertise and knowledge of the market</li> <li> advice on premium rates to cha rge</li> <li> and benefit definitions and other product design features</li> <li> and specialised risk management expertise for healthcare products (e.g. facultative underwriting and claims management serives)</li> <li>Reinsurer's terms and conditions may be attractive</li> </ul>
Appropriate types of reinsurance	<ul> <li>IP</li> <li>Proportional reinsurance: quota share or surplus basis</li> <li>moth can be effective at reducing exposure to insurance risk</li> <li>moth can be effective to limit max. loss on any one claim Reciprocal QS could be used to build a more diversified portfolio / reduce claim volatility</li> <li>Risk premium or original terms</li> <li>Mon-proportional: Aggregate XoL can be used to protect against excess claims across the portfolio from e.g. a single peril or major claim event (catastrophe cover)</li> <li>CI</li> </ul>

..... because benefit amount is a fixed sum

Typically risk premium reinsurance (CI is often a rider benefit)

[6]

[4]

#### PMI

		Individual QS could be sought, particularly by a company without its own experience e.g. to reduce exposure to mispricing risk Risk Excess of Loss is effective to contain the insurers claim outgo in relation to single large claims Portfolio stop loss reinsurance limits the insurer's losses across the whole portfolio whis is effective at reducing the risk of insolvency but may be difficult to obtain from the reinsurer because interests maybe poorly aligned between the parties.
Rationale State scheme	for	Main motivation is clearly to contain costs of the scheme
		Deductible limits exposure of the scheme to small claims which are typically frequent and relatively costly to administer and affordable for the individual Co-pay maintains an alignment of financial interests intended to reduce non-essential use of health services Cap on room rates will influence pricing behaviour of providers if they wish to receive admissions under the scheme and means that resources are directed to essential elements of care rather than luxurious accommodation etc Similar limits may well apply to professional fees and other elements of treatment costs Exclusions ensure that the scheme covers essential care only Restricting the scheme to those in formal employment and their families may well make the scheme easier to manage e.g. the employer may participate in aspects of administration for the scheme employers +/- 'ees may be required to make contributions to fund the scheme
Types of PMI		<ul> <li>Private insurers could offer products to fill the gaps in the State scheme – i.e. costs not reimbursed by the scheme</li> <li>e.g. to insure a proportion of the deductible and copay under the state scheme</li> <li>Costs that exceed the limits under the State scheme can be insured in various ways</li> <li>Daily hospital cash cover provides a fixed cash amount for each day hospitalised</li> <li> which would enable a claimant to upgrade the quality of hospital room while an inpatient</li> <li>Major medical cover, with benefits set at an appropriate level, could be offered to meet the costs of expensive procedures that exceed the limits of the State scheme</li> </ul>

**Q.6**)

[4]

[3]

	Supplementary reimbursement cover could be offered to provide higher effective limits for some or all elements of the costs of care including cover for certain procedures excluded under the State scheme or paramedical services (e.g.optical, dental, physio., nursing care)
Impact on State	Insuring part of the copay and deductible would have the effect
scheme costs	of reducing the effectiveness of the risk control mechanisms of
	the State scheme
	with the result that claims costs may increase
	If privately insured benefits exceed the personal out-of-pocket
	costs under the State scheme, individuals may incentivised to
	utilise the health services to a greater extent
	The existence of PMI cover in the market may tend to drive up
	the charges made by providers
	Availability of top-up private cover may divert patients from
	approved facilities to private hospitals
	which could reduce costs for the State scheme

## **Q.7**)

Differences	Accelerated CI (ACI) is a pre-payment of the death benefit. The benefit is paid on the first to occur of death or CI Stand alone CI (SACI) provides no benefit on death If SACI is provided as rider to a life contract, the policy and death benefit remain in force following a SACI claim SACI cower needs to feature a minimum survival period to allow time to determine whether death followed a CI event or not (difficult to assess in sudden death) Factors include: Purpose of cover (e.g. ACI more suited for loan repayment) target market (e.g. if selling to policyholders with existing life cover, SACI may be complementary) affordability (ACI is cheaper)	[3]
Comprehensive cover	Condition is capable of clear, objective definition which will be durable for the duration of the contract (definition wording usually gteed) Suitable data exist to price the benefit Anti-selection risk can be minimised (e.g. by underwriting) (perceived as) a serious medical condition by potential policyholders Insured event has significant financial implications for the insured 	[9]

Potential for adverse trend in future incidence rates ..... ..... due to change in underlying incidence or impact of medical advances Conditions covered by competitors Recommendation of professional advisers (e.g. CMO, reinsurer)

Formulae	ACI: $CC = SA * (? [i_x] - ? [k_x] * q_x)$ Where: CC = expected claims cost (to add CI acceleration benefit) SA = sum assured $i_x = incidence rate of CI condition at age x k_x = proportion of deaths caused by the CI conditionq_x = mortality rate at age xthe summation is over all CI conditions covered and rating groupsSACI: CC = SA * ? [i_x * (1 - iq_x)]Where:iq_x = probability of death within the survival rate following the CI event$
Practical difficulties with formulae	the summation is over all CI conditions covered an rating groups In practice, it is difficult to obtain suitable statistics in the level of detail indicated by the formulae incidence rates by age and gender may only be available for the most common conditions – e.g. cancer – from registry data  Unlikely to have sufficient insured data Unlikely to have sufficient insured data Marginal cost of adding such minor conditions can be approximated with an appropriate, average addition to the risk rate Estimation of $k_x$ factors depends on good cause of death reporting $iq_x$ factors are difficult to estimate accurately – few data solution is often to ignore $_iq_x$ factor for all but most significant events (e.g. heart attack, stroke) Formulae give a bottom-up approach to pricing – can reconcile with top-down estimate of claims costs by reference to own / industry experience Care is required with ACI experience data – claims data are generally of $i_x$ form – ideally compare basis with experience of CI and death claims

[3]

[5]

<b>Q.8</b> )			
	Why Gtee.	May be regulatory requirement May be established mkt. practice – need to be competitive To provide security/certainty of product cost to policyholders As product alternative to reviewable business (i.e. higher premium option) Reviewable business may be difficult to review in practice so additional risk to insurer (cf. marketing benefit) may be considered low To avoid selective laspation risk on rate increase for reviewable product May be rider to gteed. life cover => expectation of fully gteed. product (e.g. accelerated CI on term business) Market may bear a high premium margin for gteed. cover (i.e. > insurer's assessment of premium for XS risk) Single premium business (e.g. immediate needs annuity) May be gteed for less that full term of contract (e.g. first 5-10 years) – within insurer's risk appetite	[4]
	Risks to insurer	<ul> <li>Mis-pricing or adverse claims trends lead to losses</li> <li>Additional reserving requirement to cover future losses reduces solvency margin cover</li> <li>Volatility of health business is not a problem per se but potential for adverse trend development in claim incidence rates</li> <li> or e.g. medical inflation, is much greater than for life business</li> <li>Potential for claims incidence shocks to increase the cost of claims is real</li> <li> e.g. medical advancement, legal precedent, tax effect</li> <li>Data to derive incidence rates may be inappropriate =&gt; XS mispricing risk cf. life business</li> <li>Insurer's assessment of the cost of the gtee. provided (incl. the cost of holding additional reserves) may make the product unattractive / uncompetitive</li> <li>More exposed to a change in reserving standards than reviewable business</li> <li>Management</li> <li>Allowance for continuation of trends in pricing (incidence, inflation etc)</li> <li>Establish higher reserves for gteed business – i.e. higher provision for adverse deviation (may well be prescribed)</li> <li>Undertake sensitivity testing – both deterministic</li> <li> and stochastic to model potential consequences of parameter uncertainty</li> <li>Level of charge for gtee. will depend, amongst other things, on level of uncertainty in base pricing assumptions</li> <li>Price for higher profit target to reflect additional risk / apply additional contingency margin</li> <li>Can cap the risks assumed by including e.g. monetary limits in the product design</li> </ul>	

Can limit the amount of business accepted (in absolute terms and as % of portfolio)

Buy appropriate reinsurance (e.g. large QS) with matching rate gtee. .....

..... but this may be difficult to obtain (at an attractive price) for some lines

## Impact of medical advances

[8]

Screening test:

CI: May reduce or increase claim rates

If early diagnosis and subsequent treatment prevent profression of the disease process to the stage that it is 'critical' => reduction in incidence

If screening accelerates CI diagnosis/procedure, claim incidence rates may increase

<u>LTC</u>:may reduce incidence(possibly years later) if test is related to the risk of future, severe disability.

Early diagnosis will not increase the risk of future disability

PMI: May increase or decrease PMI claim costs

Increase could result from costs of further investigations and treatment (including investigation of false positives)

May be savings (possibly in longer term) if early diagnosis reduces requirement for treatment later on at a more advanced state of illness

New Drug

CI: No impact for diagnosis-based covers

May reduce incidence if survival is prolonged in a pre-'critical' stage of disease in the case of CI covers triggerred by a particular level of disability

LTC: May reduce or increase care costs

Depends on whether the impact on survival has most impact at levels of disability before / after degeneration progresses to the level at which LTC is required

<u>PMI</u>: Overall impact would depend on whether underlying condition (currently and in future), including the costs of the new drug, are covered by the PMI plan

[6]

**Q.9**)

Demographic assumptions	Claim inception rates	
	Mortality and morbidity rates for healthy lives - Together these are required to determine the probability of a new IP claim arising Claim termination rates Mortality rates for disabled lives – Together these are required to determine the expected capitalised cost of a the claim annuity Consider at least all risk factors used as rating factors	
	Age / gender / smoker status	
	Occupation class / distribution method Policy duration / policy size / (underwriting)	[2]
Data sources	Insurer's own experience Of same or similar contracts Need to consider relevance of statistics particularly with regard to target market / distribution method / risk assessment / claims management / product design features Usefulness may be limited by quantity of data and immaturity of inforce policies Insurance industry statistics may address some of these limitations but inevitably less directly relevant then own experience because of (significant) experience differences between companies / product designs Population statistics for disability may be available but definition of disability is likely to differ from that used by insurers and risk characteristics of population are usually quite different from insured groups Reinsurance data may reflect a broad section of the industry  but may not reflect expected experience of direct insurers (e.g. not ground-up claims data) Published returns to the insurance supervisor Overseas data (any of the above) of limited use because of wide variations in morbidity experience between different regions	[3]
		[5]
Control over risks accepted	<u>Individual</u> Policies individually underwritten using some or all of proposal form / medical attendant's report / medical examination / additional investigations May apply policy exclusions for particular risks	1

Or charge an appropriate higher premium for any excess risk

identified

	<u>Group</u> Targeting of particular types of group for insurance (e.g. by level of occupational risk) Compulsory participation / minimum take-up rate if voluntary Active at work requirement Initial wait for new members Medical underwriting of large covers (e.g senior management) in excess of free cover limit General policy exclusions (Gp. And Indl.)	[5]
Method	<u>Vs. Formula Method</u> Advantages: Enables explicit allowance to be made for amount and timing of all cashflows including the impact of holding reserves / solvency margin	
	Allows more complex product features to be modelled explicitly Facilitates sensitivity testing of profitability Can allow easily for change in the values of parameters at different points in the life of the policy Can integrate profit testing model with a full model of new business or model office to investigate impact on the financial position of the whole office (e.g. solvency position, capital requirements) Disadvantage: complexity of model	
	<u>Vs. MSM</u> Advantages: Potentially much simpler then MSM MSM requires transition probabilities from all relevant states to all other possible states Disadvantages: MSM can provide greater insights into dynamics of insured population and robustness / sensitivities of premium rating basis	[5]
Large group pricing	<ul> <li>Large IP experience variations are found between insured groups</li> <li></li> <li> in the case of a large group, the past claims data may provide a good indication of the likely future claims cost</li> <li> because it reflects employer specific factors that have a bearing on expected claims costs (e.g. occupational risks / employer behaviour with regard to healthcare and disability)</li> <li>Past experience is weighted with the insurer's relevant book rate for group IP</li> <li> according to the level of credibility assigned to the groups' own experience</li> <li>A minimum expected number of claims to assign full credibility can be determined, depending on the confidence level that the insurer specifies for the best estimate</li> </ul>	

For lesser levels of claims a credibility factor in the range 0 to 1 is determined as e.g [expected claims / no. of claims for full credibility]<sup>0.5</sup>. = Z

Formula: adjusted rate = Z \* Actual + (1-Z) \* ExpectedLow claim frequency for IP implies a large volume of experience data is required for full credibility Poor guide to future

IP experience is influenced by many factors that my change over time, including: .....

..... product features / policy conditions / benefit levels ......

..... risk characteristics of the group (age / gender / occ. Class mix).....

..... external, macroeconomic environment / unemployment risk / employee morale etc

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